Have we reached peak far-right?
Why the European election results may be less dramatic than expected
The European Parliament elections will be taking place in just under a month, spread over four days, from 6th to 9th June. The elections will not only renew the membership of the Parliament itself but also lead to a refresh of the European Commission (the terms of the two institutions being aligned). The outcome of the vote will therefore have an influence on the membership and political direction of the Commission for the next five years (alongside the ever-important preferences of the national governments).
During the closing months of last year and into the start of this one, by far the dominant narrative was the rise of the far-right. Across many media outlets, journalists and commentators highlighted rising support for these parties and the potential for the EU to undergo a far-right takeover.
In European terms, when we say ‘far-right’, we’re talking about two political groups: the European Conservatives and Reformists (e.g. Brothers of Italy, Poland’s Law and Justice, Sweden Democrats, Spain’s Vox) and Identity & Democracy (e.g. France’s Rassemblement National, Italy’s Lega, Germany’s AfD, Freedom Party of Austria).
Initially, there was indeed good reason to believe that there was a far-right surge. Averages of polling projections over the past year had the ECR reach peaks of over 80 seats and ID over 90, compared to 68 and 59 currently. ID in particular has risen quickly since last summer.
Yet in the last few months, both groups appear to have stalled, coming down from their peaks with support staying flat at best, if not falling somewhat. The most recent projection has ECR at 74 and ID at 81. Still an increase compared to their position today but less dramatic.
So is the far-right losing steam ahead of the elections and will their final performance end up below the expectations set at the start of the year? It’s a reasonable theory and there are a few reasons to think this is the case.
First, various far-right parties have been hit by scandals in recent months. The most obvious and important case is the AfD in Germany, where the party has been rocked by one revelation after another. In January it was the story of a meeting of AfD politicians discussing plans for ‘remigration’ (a euphemism for deportation) of foreigners and German citizens deemed not to be sufficiently German. More recently, the party’s links to Russia and China have been put under the spotlight. The party’s top two candidates for the European Parliament elections have both been caught up in accusations of spying and taking money from Beijing and Moscow. Other far-right parties have done a better job of keeping a low profile but many still face questions about their links to Russia and criticism of aid to Ukraine can easily blow up in their faces (as it did for EKRE in Estonia, for example).
Second, the co-opting of far-right ideas by ‘centre-right’ parties. It would be naïve not to consider that part of the reason some far-right parties have been wavering is that key pillars of their agenda have been taken up by parties nominally from the centre-right. Increased hostility towards migrants, especially asylum seekers, has become much more common among all parties on the right in Europe. Social problems, like crime and homelessness, are denied their social component as the centre-right elevates a theory of harsh repression. And parties have started to pull away from support for LGBT groups, often splitting over trans rights, in order to pitch more social conservatism. In some countries, the centre-right has become so close to the far-right in its political outlook and values that they govern together (like in Sweden, Italy or Finland, at the national level, but also in many regions in Spain).
Third, moderate mobilisation. It is generally true to say that most media and commentators underestimate the degree of moderate backlash when radical parties gain in strength. Such a backlash may not be immediate, indeed it can take many years, but it is highly unusual for it not to manifest at all. We have seen it in Britain, with the collapse in support for both Brexit and the Tories, we saw it in Poland, we saw it in Spain, we’re seeing it in Germany – we’re arguably even seeing it in Hungary now. In 2019, expectations of a far-right surge were undone by the surprise success of green and liberal parties. While it would be optimistic to hope for a turnaround of the same magnitude, I expect that moderate mobilisation on election day will again rain on the far-right’s parade.
None of this is to say that the far-right won’t do comparatively well come the European Parliament elections in June. We should still expect them to improve on their 2019 scores and become a more sizeable political force. Their views, particularly that of the ECR, will become more relevant in the next five years than in the five that just passed.
What it does mean, however, is that the final result is unlikely to be worse than what projections show today. Will we see a shift to the right in the European political landscape? Certainly. But this will not be a sweeping revolution to overturn the established order. Policies may change, but a ‘far-right EU’ this is not.