If it feels like the news has been positive for Putin recently, that’s because it has been. A string of events over the last two weeks have displayed every facet of Russia’s approach to warfare and how Putin hopes to reach victory.
1. International propaganda
The rundown starts on 6th February, when Putin gave an interview to American right-wing personality, Tucker Carlson.
The interview itself was not necessarily that much of a success. It was about as convincing as any extended rant by an old man half-remembering old history books can be. Carlson himself was made to look wildly out of depth as he was confronted with discussions on issues that he clearly had no prior knowledge of and had not researched. Putin even mocked him in the aftermath as a poor journalist, stating that he was not satisfied with the exchange.
Yet the interview itself did not need to be high quality or even convincing in order to achieve Moscow’s aims. For one thing, the intended audience was very much the international crowd, not people in Russia (Russians themselves seemed to have better things to do). In that regard, it’s hard to deny that the interview gathered substantial international attention.
By extension, the interview was successful in flooding the field of debate in Europe and America. Not necessarily producing any real or serious arguments but unloading a deluge of falsehoods and misdirection that could then be used by Putin sympathisers in the West. It served the primary goal of nearly all international communication carried out by the Russian state: to obscure the truth.
2. Domestic repression
On 16th February, the world was rocked by an announcement out of Russia. Leading opposition figure, Alexei Navalny, had died while in prison, almost certainly at the hands of the regime. Navalny was an almost unique figure in Russian politics, his support cutting across many of the traditional social divides (especially between cities and rural areas). His threat to Putin was obvious and he had already survived an assassination attempt by the time he returned to Russia in 2021, when he was immediately arrested.
Putin has regularly made use of violence against his internal opponents in order to cement his power. ‘Falling out of a window’ has become a euphemism for not only the systematic murder of potential threats to Putin’s control but also for the minimum effort that the Kremlin puts into trying to cover up its crimes. The Putinist system hardly bothers creating plausible deniability, preferring instead to taunt its opponents with the obviousness of the lies.
Any slight civil society movement is similarly targeted with intense and uncompromising repression. Some burgeoning anti-war protests at the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were swiftly stamped down by the security services. Even the much more innocuous act of holding a memorial for Navalny led to numerous arrests. Anything that could bring people together into a potential anti-regime political movement is strangled at birth.
Although no idea can be eliminated by mere force, this kind of proactive repression of civil society ensures that individuals remain atomised, shorn of any supportive community that could reduce or spread the risks of opposition. Faced with the immense personal costs of standing alone, many private critics of the regime are understandably reluctant to come out in public.
3. Meatgrinder warfare
The day after the Navalny announcement, more bad news came from the frontline in Ukraine; Kyiv’s forces were to withdraw from Avdiivka, a city the two sides had been intensely contesting since the start of the war.
With Ukraine lacking ammunition, Russia was able to use sheer weight of numbers to force a breakthrough. To achieve this ‘victory’, Moscow decided to take on monstrously high casualty rates; by some estimates, around 3000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded for every square mile captured.
The battle represented a casual disregard for life that would see generals elsewhere demoted and which would generate a public outcry in any democratic country. It is not something the Ukrainians could, or even would, consider. For Russia, this is accepted as standard practice, so long as it gets the job done.
4. Western complacency
Finally, we’ve had the Munich Security Conference, which just closed on Sunday. A gathering of key figures from various Western countries to discuss the top security and defence issues of the day, it could have been an incubator for important new ideas, bringing together the right people in the right place to strike key agreements. Yet it was in large parts a simple repetition of existing positions. While politicians expressed their deep concern over the fall of Avdiivka and the murder of Navalny, nothing concrete was put forward as a response.
Some US politicians at the conference went so far as to defend their opposition to giving more assistance to Ukraine, as Washington’s deadlock on the issue grinds on.
This is arguably the most pivotal aspect of Putin’s strategy, the bet that, when Russia carries out all the above actions, the West will hesitate to respond. More important that any single Russian policy is the confidence in Moscow that they will ultimately get away with it, the opposing reaction informing the actions themselves.
So is there anything to be positive about?
Well there has been one bright spot: the firming up of European support for Ukraine. Following the UK-Ukraine security agreement signed in January, Kyiv has now also announced treaties with France and Germany. The agreements include commitments for the Western European capitals to support Ukraine in the event of any future Russian invasion, continued long-term military aid and training, help in demining Ukrainian territory and a lockdown on Russian assets. The pacts will all last for 10 years, with the option to be renewed.
These efforts will need to be deepened and accelerated to grow into a comprehensive strategy for Ukrainian victory. Putin has shown us his strategy, we need to advance ours.