For Russians involved in the country’s war effort, being away from the frontline is increasingly proving to be of little comfort or protection. Constrained by a lack of supplies to conduct a more conventional offensive and liberate the territories occupied by Russia, Ukraine has been ramping up drone and missile strikes against Russia’s Black Sea ports and ships and against oil infrastructure within Russia.
Just in the past week, Ukrainian forces successfully damaged the Kuybyshev oil refinery in Russia and hit two Russian landing ships stationed near Sevastopol in occupied Crimea. A third of Russia’s Black Sea fleet is believed to have now been taken out of action and twelve refineries have been forced offline.
In spite of delays in weapons deliveries from Ukraine’s supporters in Europe and a total blockade on the assistance package from the US, Kyiv has shown resourcefulness and ingenuity in devising new ways to keep up the pressure on Moscow. While Ukraine lacks the equipment and manpower to try a new counteroffensive, and has recently tended to lose land along the frontline, it has been able to continue to attrition Russia’s ability to prosecute this war.
The attacks on oil refineries in particular may become a real problem for Moscow if Ukraine can sustain the pace and intensity of these attacks. Already 11% of Russia’s oil refining capacity has been knocked out. The most recent strike was just this weekend.
This will harm Russia’s crucial energy export revenues, the money upon which not only the economy, but also the corrupt political system, is built. The more oil and gas income suffers, the more vulnerable the Putinist regime becomes to both popular and elite discontent.
Ideally, this issue would not even be relevant as Western sanctions on Russian oil were meant to drastically curtail this revenue, yet the sanctions have been imperfectly designed and poorly enforced.
Worse, Western governments appear to have decided that it wasn’t worth fixing these problems as they are unwilling to take on the cost of higher energy prices. Indeed, we know from recent reports that Washington has been pressuring Kyiv to stop targeting Moscow’s oil infrastructure, partly because they fear it will cause a notable increase in prices during an election year. The morality of that particular calculation aside, it demonstrates that Ukraine’s attacks are really having an impact (no doubt the reason why Kyiv appears to be entirely ignoring the calls from across the Atlantic).
Already Russia is having to reduce its level of exports for oil products in order to satisfy demand at home. If the situation escalates further and the domestic supply is impacted, producing queues at petrol stations or pushing up prices, then Ukraine will succeed in bringing the war home for ordinary Russians. This will not in itself set off popular rebellion but will feed into resistance to mobilisation and unrest in the provinces.
At the same time, the steady erosion of Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea has two strategic benefits for Ukraine. Not only it will leave the Crimean peninsula more vulnerable to any future liberation by Ukrainian forces (along with the destruction of the Kerch bridge), it also represents a massive waste of resources for Russia, which must, as a matter of national prestige and military egotism, invest in a fleet that does very little to help Russia advance its own goals.
Even where Russia is strongest, making territorial gains along the frontline, the Ukrainian war of attrition is leaving its mark. Kyiv’s armed forces are digging in with more defensive positions, constructing new tank traps, digging trenches and laying minefields. Recent gains by Russia have proven incredible costly. The capture of Avdiivka, while strategically and symbolically important, is estimated to have led to more Russian deaths than the entire Soviet-Afghan war. Ukraine aims to ensure that any further advances will be just as deadly for Moscow’s troops.
Even if today Ukraine is not in a position to advance into Russian-held territory, they can make sure that the Russian operation is slowed to a series of uncertain, stumbling steps – a long walk, barefoot on broken glass.
None of this will help Ukraine liberate the occupied territories. By itself, attrition cannot win the war against an enemy that is so much larger in every respect. However, the attrition war can win Ukraine something valuable: time. Time for the Americans to get their act together. Time for European weapon deliveries to catch up. Time for European defence companies to ramp up production.
When last year’s counteroffensive failed to produce results, many assumed that Western support would dry up and that Ukraine would be forced to do a deal under Russian terms. As so often during this war, the Ukrainians were underestimated. They have shown that it will keep on fighting, with whatever methods and tools they have available, to inflict damage wherever they can. It this endurance that has given birth to an attrition strategy that is now paying dividends even as the country is on the back foot. This will keep Kyiv in the fight as it prepares for its next opportunity to push back the Russian invasion.