Bad partners

Why China is not the answer to the lost transatlantic alliance

Looking around at the discussions on how Europe should respond to America’s new rejection of democracy and human rights, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of people throwing around the idea of a European pivot to China – a new partner to replace the old one. But there are serious questions to be asked over whether this would actually be in our interests.

Sometimes this pivot is presented as a logical, mechanical consequence of the destruction of the transatlantic relationship by Washington. Europe is seen as in a fragile state, with weak foundations and a struggling economy. Accordingly, it cannot sustain an oppositional relationship with both China and the US, while a war with Russia rages on with no signs of a swift end. The European economy has been designed to be open, with an emphasis on exports. It has neither the domestic consumption of the US, nor the state-driven investment of China. Because the European economy is not sufficiently self-sustaining, it must have a productive relationship either with the West or the East. If the US is shutting the door, then reaching out to China becomes the necessary default European policy move.

Others give Europe more agency and present a pivot to China as a deliberate decision. While the economic benefits would still apply, such a move is also to be understood as a political action. The US has spent many years trying to lever Europe away from China, through both persuasion and force. Europe, while being much less convinced than Washington of the merits of this path, has gone along with it in order to maintain the relationship with America. Now that America is blowing up this relationship anyway, there is a suggestion that Europe should show its former partners across the Atlantic that this comes at a cost to direct American interests in Asia. It also serves to underline that Europe has options outside the United States and that maybe next time the Americans should think twice before treating Europe as disposable.

Now this is all well and good, and there is some merit to both conceptions. But if we put aside the conflict with Washington, is getting closer to Beijing actually want we want? In a world where Washington say they hate us and Moscow say they want to destroy us, it is easy to be lured in by the formality and apparent respect that comes from Beijing.

But beneath the civility and normality, we should not forget what kind of place China is. The Chinese Communist Party runs a dictatorial regime increasingly built around a cult of personality in the form of Xi Jinping. Dissenters and political opponents are routinely imprisoned or worse. The country operates an incredibly extensive system of mass censorship, to the extent of trying to operate a parallel internet. The CCP crushed what little democracy and civil liberties existed in Hong Kong. They have supported Russia’s war against Ukraine, both directly (through dual-use goods exports) and indirectly (through diplomatic efforts). And critically for anyone considering expanding Sino-European relations, we cannot rule out that Beijing will, at some point in the coming years, try its own imperialist landgrab by attacking Taiwan.

Like someone just out of a long-term relationship, Europe should not rebound into the nearest, but still toxic, partner available.

If we are to learn anything from our attempt at building constructive relations with Russia, it should be that democracies and autocracies can only co-exist in a limited manner. For as long as any democracy exists and acts as a beacon to the world of the promise of liberty and justice, it represents a threat to all autocracies. Sooner or later, these authoritarian regimes will seek to snuff out that threat, if for nothing more than the basic instinct of self-preservation.

We should therefore hold no illusions about what it means to partner with a dictatorship like China and should think very carefully about deepening what is already a serious dependency.

Instead – and to extend the relationship analogy – there is a serious case to be made for working on ourselves rather than seeking out someone else to support us.

Across just the population of countries actively seeking to join the EU, there are some 50 million people that could be added to the productive workforce – building, creating, innovating for our common good if only they had access to the wider economy on equal terms. Add in the countries that are not seeking membership but which could do so within the next decade and we could add over 100 million workers to the EU economy. The potential to expand the dynamism and productive capacity of Europe’s economy by unlocking the full human capital of Europe is immense.

Similarly, while the Single Market has done wonders for growth and competitiveness in Europe, there is plenty of scope to go further. At its core, the Single Market is really geared towards trade in physical goods. Deepening integration in services, with greater use of mutual recognition for qualifications, cutting back on national exemptions, making it easier to set up businesses that can operate in any EU country and eliminating barriers to the cross-border digital economy could add significant economic strength. For all the anxiety around potential US tariffs, former ECB President Mario Draghi recently noted that the remaining internal barriers in the EU economy are equivalent to a 110% levy on services. Unblocking this trade with ourselves would make us much less dependent on the preferences of either Beijing or Washington.

Even for areas that we consider to be critical weaknesses where we rely on external partners – notably energy and defence – sound investments and effective policy can make us much more self-sufficient than we are today. A massive expansion of clean energy, whether in the form of renewables or nuclear, will not just help save the planet but will also generate energy independence for Europe and create an escape route from today’s juggling act between American and Russian gas. In defence too, we are not so dependent on the kindness of others as we might think. More long-term contracts would give our defence industry the stability it needs to invest in expanded production. Pooling together orders from our governments to increase the scale of these deals would also make possible a massive and rapid increase in output of much-needed military equipment. Allocating these contracts to the best European offer, without national favour, would make the whole process more efficient and bring down the overall cost.

Our economic and political instincts drive us towards seeking international partnerships to shore up our weaknesses at home. There is merit in this and no one is suggesting we revive autarky. But to rush into the embrace of the world’s dictators (of which China is the main, but not the only, example) would mean failing to learn the lessons of history. Far from a spent force that must accommodate the world’s new great powers, Europe has plenty of strength left to shape its own destiny and that of the world – if only we are willing to use it.