Beyond the phoney wars – what matters for Europe post-Trump

Building capacity must be the priority

Since Donald Trump won the US election, Europe has been caught in a debate over what to do next. We ask ourselves whether we should give more support to Ukraine, whether we should put in place retaliatory tariffs, whether we should get tougher on China.

Yet the truth is that many of these are phoney debates. We are considering our options and what choices to make in areas where we do not really have the luxury of multiple viable options, where the decision has already been made for us. Rather than end outcomes, what we urgently need to discuss is how to build up our capacity to choose, for in this capacity lies our independence and freedom.

Take Ukraine and defence. Today we are discussing support for Ukraine in light of a potential shift in the US position. Yet there is no decision for us to make here. The sad and shameful truth is that we cannot support Ukraine to the same degree the US has been. While Europe is an important financial contributor, a lot of the military equipment going to Kyiv has been American. That is not something we can replace in two months’ time.

There is therefore no debate to be had on whether to support Ukraine but rather a debate on building up the capacity to even be able to make that decision in the first place. The foreign policy decision must be matched to industrial and defence policy decisions before the former can even be meaningful. In practical terms, spending on Europe’s defence industry must increase, through more joint and interoperable projects. Production of tanks, planes, missiles and all the components of the supply chain must be increased. Governments will need to issue long-term public contracts to get the private companies to invest in this elevated manufacturing capacity.

Moving back further, we must consider the fiscal policy that will then enable us to pay for these investments. Most governments in Europe are fiscally constrained. Spending more on defence industrial capacity will therefore require trade-offs. We must choose between running higher national deficits, cutting spending in other areas, returning to joint European borrowing or some balance of the three.

If we fail to do this, to have the real debates and make the right decisions, then assurances that we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes will not be worth the paper they are written on – Washington will have already made the decision for us.

Perhaps in the past, the situation would not have been so stark. When there was an effective system of international institutions, we could rely on these to enforce and uphold some of our preferred policy outcomes. International law could restrain the behaviour of otherwise wayward states, either through direct enforcement or through indirect, normative pressure.

Yet today many of these institutions and values are openly disregarded by an assortment of autocrats and populists, who suffer little to no consequences as a result. The United States itself has led the way in this regard, even before the election of Trump. Washington has played a key role in steadily gutting the ability of the WTO to maintain an open and liberalising international trade system. With Trump in charge, this will only get worse. And we have already seen Trump-aligned politicians and commentators push for sanctions against the ICC after the latter issued an arrest warrant for Israel’s Netanyahu. Even trying to defend these institutions – which we set up to maintain global order – can now put any Western democracy on a collision course with the US.

All of this is a problem for Europe as a whole and is particularly acute for those countries outside of the EU. In Britain, we amuse ourselves by talking about whether to align with the EU or the US. Yet our ability to actually decide one way or another is highly limited. The UK’s ultimate position is less likely to be a decision made by Westminster politicians on the basis of a democratic mandate than it is to be a balance between competing structural pressures (our greater economic ties to the EU versus the extent of US pressure and the exact demands Trump might make). In all likelihood, that will mean seeking greater alignment with the EU in practice while rhetorically keeping a low profile with the US.

For Europeans, our best hope at having control over our destinies is to stick together. To ensure this power, we must avoid fracturing our efforts. Even the largest European state is a fraction the size of China or the US and alone could not rival Russia’s military strength. In today’s stormy seas, European unity is the ocean liner that will provide us with strength and stability. Through deeper economic integration we can revitalise our markets and expand the capacity for public investment in strategic sectors. Through a unified trade policy, we can cut our dependencies and diversify our partnerships, while securing fair deals. Through military integration we can maximise the effectiveness of our defence spending, avoid wasteful duplication and reduce our reliance on the whims of others.

In an era of growing geopolitical instability, with more threats on our borders and less reliable allies around the world, the top priority for Europe is not the choices we make. It is developing the ability to make our own choices.