Does it matter if Russia boosts the far right?

Tackling voter apathy about foreign interference

Last week, I read an article on Russian interference in French politics. The Washington Post piece described how pro-Russian individuals were building links between Moscow and the French far-right, the financial ties between the two sides, the exploitation of social divisions in France and the boosting of pro-Russian and generally pro-chaos voices on French social media.

As I read the piece, what surprised me most was how unsurprised I was. Did we not know this already? Perhaps five years ago I would have felt that my suspicions were confirmed but still be taken aback by the strength of the evidence and how clear it was that these ‘patriotic’ nationalists were actively working in the interests of Putin, a murderous dictator. I would have perhaps have seen this as an important part of the political debate, a necessary conversation in political settings.

Yet today, I do not have any of these feelings. The links between the European far-right and the Russian regime have been explored multiple times and in a lot of detail, both by the media and by intelligence services. At this stage, if you’re still supporting the far-right then either these ties don’t bother you or you will always refuse to believe it.

This prompted me to ask myself whether these kinds of stories still matter. If everyone already knows, and has already drawn the consequences, then perhaps it is a misdirection of our energies to spend any great amount of time on it. If that is the case, then we need to adjust our standard approach as support for the far-right rises.

Naturally, this is not to suggest that the media shouldn’t keep on reporting on these stories. There is an obvious public interest in having this kind of knowledge out in the open. Even if they give it little weight, voters should be informed about the geopolitical reasoning and international alliances of their political parties. In the UK, it is a regret that the media larged glossed over the Tories ditching their relationships with moderate centre-right parties in the EU in the early 2000s to partner up with hard-right populists; a transition that was given insufficient weight when compared to what it told us about the future.

Still, it’s hard to escape the conclusion that in terms of political campaigning and voter persuasion, there’s little interest in pushing the issue of ties to Russia.

Perhaps if some kind of crime had actually been committed then this would be an essential political issue but it is rare to ever see anything of that nature. For better or for worse, typically the relationships between far-right politicians and actors in Moscow may be morally dubious but are legally above board.

In the absence of a smoking gun, voters do not seem to be moved by the mere fact of a party or politicians having close ties to Putin’s government. To that extent, these reports do not matter.

At this point, some would fall back on the old adage that voters don’t care about foreign policy and that there is a need to focus instead on ‘bread and butter’ issues. Yet this would be both an excessive response and a strategic mistake.

Even if foreign policy doesn’t have the greatest impact on voters’ decisions, having an informed debate on a country’s foreign policy is still essential. And if voters can be persuaded that, yes, European unity is important, Russia is a threat, and our interests are served by Ukraine’s liberation, this will have a positive impact. Even in a world where the electorate prioritises the domestic economic policies offered by the far-right, the public perception of those foreign policy issues can constrain and limit far-right advances.

So in the face of apparent public indifference, there are two things campaigners should learn.

First, there is a need to step back and realise that too many moderate and left-leaning leaders are taking for granted that association with Russia should be a moral disqualification. Many voters obviously do not feel this way and if they weren’t voting for the far-right before, it probably wasn’t because of this.

To remedy this situation, we need to remake the case for why Russia is such a problem and why being run by Russia-aligned parties would be so dangerous. This may seem self-evident in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but Western publics are not mobilised in the defence of Ukraine to the extent one would hope.

Part of the problem is the way defenders of liberal democracy talk about the war and our interests. In communicating with electorates, these leaders and campaigners stick to high-level notions of preserving democracy around the world and of pushing back the forces of evil. While the rhetoric is often soaring in style, it falls flat next to the far-right’s much more direct discourse on the dangers of nuclear war and the impact of sanctions on the cost of living.

Indeed, looking at the issue through the lens of high-level concepts may actually help the far-right in selling their proposals of a peace based on land concessions. In this framing, conjuring images of men in suits gathered around a table to draw lines on a map, the human cost and suffering of this ‘solution’, the literal torture to be inflicted on those people in the occupied territories, is largely obscured.

Second, the reality of Russian connections to the European far-right is important information for future election campaigns. They inform political parties and activists about the nature of this fight, help describe the battlefield.

We know that far-right groups will be getting boosts on social media from Russian troll farms and that their talking points will be promoted as part of mass astroturfing exercises. To be caught off guard by such tactics in 2016 was perhaps forgivable but everyone should be anticipating it and planning for it in 2024.

Partly this is already being done through tightened regulation on content moderation but this has its limits (especially when Twitter is owned by someone who has no desire to enforce these rules and who also sympathises with the far-right). A more robust response could involve calling out these operations in person, in real time, rather than waiting 6-12 months for the eventual parliamentary inquiry. Or, failing any superior option, flooding the field with alternative messages. If social media is to be a cesspit of disinformation then better to make it an unusable cesspit.

The ties between far-right groups and Moscow are well known now but it’s obvious media reports on the subject aren’t landing with the public in the way we might hope. It’s time for liberal democrats to shake off the reflex of sharing these stories with an expectation of public outrage and reimagine a broader strategy for countering Russian influence in a way which speaks more directly to voters and more actively undermines the usual Russian playbook.