Necessary minimum integration

How to handle the European defence revolution

There’s no denying that defence policy in Europe is now going through a massive overhaul. Our populations and governments have been rocked by the succession of betrayals emanating out of Washington. From shouting down Ukraine’s President and calling him a dictator, to shutting off intelligence sharing and repeatedly bringing into question America’s NATO commitments, the Trump administration has demonstrated that it would much sooner shake hands with Russia’s bloody regime than stand by European democracy. Whether in private or in public, Europe’s leaders are now asking themselves whether the US can be trusted to support us in the event of an attack by Moscow. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, Europe stands alone.

It is telling that lifelong Atlanticists, for whom the connection to America is written into the nation’s political psyche, are now calling for an alternative (European) solution. Newly elected Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced shortly after he won Germany’s last elections that his country needed to become more independent of the US. Similarly, the Polish government is now reaching out to France to seek the protection of Paris’ nuclear arsenal, having lost confidence in Washington.

In one regard, there has been swift progress. Europe is moving to significantly increase its levels of defence spending. To make this happen, the European Commission announced last week a new programme, ReArm Europe, made up of a variety of tools to bring more money to the defence sector. This includes opening up €150bn in loans to EU countries, suspending the usual debt and deficit rules and bringing in the European Investment Bank (which has historically been prevented from supporting defence projects). Individual European countries are also shifting priorities and either reallocating funds (as in Britain) or taking on more debt (as in Germany, where a special exemption to its national deficit rules is being created) to boost the amount of money going to Europe’s national militaries.

Yet there is a trap here. Part of the reason that European countries have been able to spend much less on defence in recent decades is not simply that they were free-riding on America, but that integrating into America’s military structures substantially reduced the need for duplication and waste. If we focus purely on how much money we spend, on the nominal percentage of GDP, then we will bring back much of that waste and fail to build up the real capacity to fight a war against a single, massive opponent. We must think beyond the simple total number of troops, weapons platforms, tanks and jets and consider how all these elements will fight together. What are the structures that will join together a group of German tanks, some Italian air defence, French jets and Polish soldiers? What are we doing to forge them from a disparate and uncoordinated set of individual assets into an effective fighting force?

At the same time, we must resist the temptation to fall into a long and unproductive debate on a ‘European army’. Even in the current context, it is highly unlikely that we will be able to perform this kind of long-distance jump in military integration. The civilian, political structures to wield such an army do not exist and would be deeply controversial to establish, potentially amounting to an unwieldy system of ‘war by committee’. To the extent that it might be possible to simultaneously and successfully undertake this level of political and military integration (that would likely amount to nothing less than the federalisation of Europe) it would take far too long to justify in the current emergency.

To address these competing demands – the need for military cohesion on the one hand and the reality of European integration debates on the other – there is a middle path: Necessary Minimum Integration.

NMI is about finding the absolute minimum level of integration that will satisfy our urgent requirements to establish a European fighting force independent of the United States. It is an approach to the current debates where the overriding question that must be answered at every turn is: what is the least that we can get away with? Anything below this threshold is inadequate. Anything above it is a luxury. Like finding shelter from a storm, NMI is neither the leaves of a tree nor the shingle roof, it is simply whatever scrap of wood or metal will keep us dry.

It will be for leaders and politicians to truly define NMI, as they are the only ones who can really determine the minimum threshold. However, to flesh out the concept further, here are some examples of how NMI could and should be applied.

First, specific consolidation of Europe’s military forces. Here we must contend with two realities. One is that 30-odd national militaries, each with their own command structure, is impossible to manage effectively. The other is that a single European army under a single command is not going to happen any time soon. So what is feasible? A potential NMI approach here would be to define 4 or 5 sections of the border between Europe and Russia. Each of these would be assigned a lead country, who would appoint the overall commander for that section. Likely candidates for this role would be France, Britain, Germany and Poland (Ukraine is discounted for the moment only because it is already at war). Smaller countries, with neither the resources nor experience to lead a section themselves, would then voluntarily contribute forces to one or more sections.

Second, air defence. Europe is running behind on air defence capability. There are some European missile systems and some amount of industrial production to supply them, but they are insufficient next to the volume of air attacks Russia can launch and the speed of some of their missiles. We need to maximise the coverage of whatever air defence we can pull together as much as possible. A potential NMI approach would involve a linked-up system of air defence across at least the countries which border Russia. Any aerial threat coming towards any European country would be intercepted by the nearest available asset, whether that be planes or anti-air missile systems, regardless of who owns it. Countries reserving their strength only for those threats that are headed towards them directly would be a thing of the past.

Third, satellites. Satellite connectivity plays an increasingly vital role in modern warfare. They support the guidance systems of many missiles and drones, without which the weapons in question become much less accurate, forcing you to fire more in order to be certain to hit the target. Satellites can deliver highly flexible, off-grid internet access, maintaining communication and information-sharing across large stretches of territory that would otherwise risk being cut off, including both military infrastructure and crucial civilian support (like medical care). They also provide detailed imaging of the battlefield, helping to identify enemy movements and actions in occupied territory. As it stands, American satellites play a crucial role in all of these. Fortunately, there are European alternatives being developed in the form of private companies like Eutelsat, as well as more public initiatives like Iris2. From an NMI perspective, the important point here is to ensure that we do not end up with a fractured landscape of European satellite service providers. Countries should come together in joint contracts and, for military purposes at least, ensure instant sharing of all relevant information. A country like Italy going off on its own to sign a Starlink contract, for instance, would be deeply unhelpful.

Fourth, nuclear deterrent. Although potentially the most significant and controversial idea around, it is the area where the discussion is already the most advanced. This is partly because French President Emmanuel Macron already proposed developing a European approach to nuclear deterrence a few years ago. It is also because talk of an ‘EU bomb’ was quickly overtaken by what we could categorise as an NMI approach. France has its own independent nuclear weapons (Britain’s are semi-independent because they rely on US maintenance and servicing). France can therefore create its own nuclear umbrella along the same principles as the American one: if any country under France’s protection is targeted by a nuclear weapon, France would use its own nuclear weapons to respond. Shifting from an American nuclear umbrella to a French nuclear umbrella is much more realistic for quickly patching up Europe’s defence than any notion of shared decision-making between multiple European countries.

The specifics of these examples are not as important as the application of the general NMI approach, whether to formalise and consolidate decisions that are already being taken, or to kick-start them in the right direction. Europe is in a race against time to secure its defence, but a chaotic scrum of each and every one of our national militaries will not be enough to meet our needs. At the same time, we must not allow debates on integration and national sovereignty to turn into a black hole that sucks up precious time and energy. Alongside money, it is imperative that we develop solutions that boost our real capacity, and that we do so fast.