Ukraine: money, membership and munition

Amid growing fears, Europe must launch a new wave of support

This past weekend Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was in Kyiv. She made the visit just ahead of a week where Ukraine is likely to return to the centre of current affairs in the EU thanks to new sanctions on Russia and an official report on Ukraine’s progress towards EU membership.

On the plus side, it’s all good timing. When pranksters succeeded in getting Italian Prime Minster Meloni to declare that many are getting tired of the war in Ukraine, it merely reflected a growing consensus in Western media commentary that has been building ever since the counteroffensive failed to deliver on people’s hopes. Hamas’ attack on Israel has only reinforced concerns that Western governments won’t be able to keep up their support for Ukraine.

Yet it’s unlikely to be enough. Even so long after Russia began its war against Ukraine, it’s not clear that Europe really has an overarching strategy for supporting Ukraine. At least part of the problem with the lead-up to the counteroffensive was precisely the focus on that one operation. All discussions on military equipment and financial help revolved around one moment, making the whole focus inherently short-termist. Governments only looked at what Ukraine might need for the next 3-6 months, leaving them scrambling for answers now.

If Europe wants to seriously support Ukraine then it needs a laser focus on the three Ms: money, membership and munition.

Let’s start with arguably the most important: munition. Strictly speaking what I really mean here is ammunition. Although plenty of military equipment can be useful for Ukraine in defending itself and liberating its territory, the most pressing need is not for new weapons systems. If anything, Ukraine already has too many different weapon systems, complicating supply and repairs.

More useful would be to get more ammunition for the weapons that it already has. We know that Ukraine is running out of shells and across NATO, officials and governments are warning that they are running out of spare capacity in their stockpiles. In spite of the EU committing to deliver one million artillery rounds to Ukraine by next March, the goal is not even halfway fulfilled.

The failure mostly falls into two categories: countries spending on defence for themselves and countries not spending enough. The problem with the latter is obvious and easy to criticise. In particular, some countries have been too reluctant to give out long-term contracts, meaning defence suppliers are unwilling to expand their production capacity. It’s a continuation of the short-termist approach to this conflict.

But the former group is also a problem and a more pernicious one at that. Countries that have massively ramped up their defence spending win easy plaudits from commentators and favourable headlines. They use these budgeting assessments to wield a moral high ground and protect themselves from criticism. Nonetheless, merely spending more on defence does nothing by itself to help Ukraine win the war. More tanks and planes to sit in storage in your own country will not help the Ukrainians liberate Mariupol.

Everyone must be judged by what they actually send to Ukraine - the real practical help. Focusing on spending in isolation, notably the 2% NATO target, is a distraction. Bigger and more enduring orders of supplies, that are then sent on to the frontline, are the real goal.

The second most pressing issue is money. Unsurprisingly the war has devastated Ukraine’s economy and it needs external help to keep everything running. At this stage, the EU is the most important actor in this field (and likely will be in any post-conflict reconstruction too).

The key negotiations concern €50bn to be given to Ukraine for the next year. Currently the talks in Brussels are stalled because of two separate disputes. On the one hand, Hungary has repeatedly held up progress here. The country’s leader, Viktor Orbán, is an open friend of Putin and so is happy to disrupt any assistance to Ukraine. He also wants to use the money as a bargaining chip, to convince the European Commission to unlock funds that have been frozen as part of a crack down on Hungary’s abuses against the rule of law.

On the other hand, there is also a broader argument over how the €50bn should be funded. Some countries say that the EU budget needs to expand in order to deal with the greater demands being placed on it. Others say that there is still cash to spare and that if necessary other expenditure should be cut to prioritise support for Ukraine.

If the EU can resolve these twin debates and get approval for the funding for Ukraine by the end of this year then so much the better. But there needs to be a political willingness to think creatively if finding a compromise proves impossible. Supporters of Ukraine must ensure that intra-EU politics does not get in the way of the wider EU interest or strategy. With this in mind, organising funding outside of the EU budget, with countries providing their share of the money bilaterally to Ukraine, is one possible workaround.

Finally, membership. While much more long-term than the other two issues, it is the one that will be most in the spotlight this week. That’s because the Commission is expected to present a report that will recommend starting accession negotiations with Ukraine.

This would only be the beginning of a much longer journey. Accession negotiations are divided into a number of ‘chapters’, setting out each aspect of membership that a country needs to comply with before it can even be considered for membership. This process can, and often does, take years. And even then, a country may complete these negotiations only to find itself blocked by as little as one veto, as an existing member decides to push its own narrow interests (North Macedonia has been a particular victim of this sort of petty politics).

Still, a positive recommendation from the Commission would be a significant step forwards and an important morale boost for Ukraine. To reinforce the momentum and progress in Ukraine’s EU journey, national governments will need to swiftly follow up on the Commission’s report and give the formal go-ahead when they meet for a summit of EU leaders in December.

There is a creeping despair in our political discourse today. More and more people doubt whether Europe is able or willing to stay the course in helping Kyiv. But to fail here would be a historic strategic mistake and so governments must reboot their approach. Across the three Ms – money, membership and munition, there is no reason why 2024 cannot kick off with a true surge in practical and moral support for Ukraine.